tang dynasty times

translating virtue

   

It was a hot, windless afternoon and the Master had led his students outside, to sit under the shade of the giant tree standing in the courtyard. As they gathered around him, the large group of young men grew so silent that they could just barely hear the sound of a myriad of birds taking flight over the Ganges River-- thousands upon thousands of miles to the west. The whole world grew very still and...

Drawing in his breath deeply; the Master slowly opened his mouth to speak:

吾未见好德如好色者也

"It is a rare man who would turn his mind to virtue when he could follow love instead" (Analects 15.13)

Nobody dared to say a word. And so the Master, with a smile on his face, spun on his heels and walked away. Really what more could be said? And the Master looked quite pleased with himself too (a fact to which everyone present later confirmed). 

Beijing, however, complains: "It's a rather innovative translation, don't you think?"

The problem being the word "love," of course. And, I realize that in our times so high do we hold Love （愛）that "love" （恋）for us must carry much more weight than it ever could possibly have for the ancients. In all fairness, the word is not really "love," but rather 色。Beijing thinks that it should probably be translated as

I've yet to meet anybody who is fonder of virtue than of sex

Fair enough, but I just don't think people talked that way back then. I mean, I cannot imagine them talking like that at least. And being in a stubborn mood, I try to persuade him:

"But what does the character 色 itself convey but the emotion felt when two people are embracing; in love." 

As a compromise, however, I here offer this:

"It is a rare man who would turn his mind to virtue when he could follow romance instead"  

Approximately 2500 years have passed since the time Kongzi was said to have uttered these words-- and in one sense, I guess it is partly comforting to think- how little has changed. A teacher wishes to gently urge his students to "keep their eye on the ball." We are all human-- and everyone loves romance-- but it's important to try and stay the course. On the other hand, I cannot possibly imagine that Kongzi is criticizing his students. They're not, afterall, monks-in- training.

To me, the interesting question is what do you think the Master would say to a bunch of students today? In one sense, it seems like romance and love affairs have really been banished to a place outside acceptable conversation ("family values" etc.)-- is it just me or do other people just find it impossible to imagine a teacher telling his students:

     It is a rare man who would choose study over romance

This is not religion and the students are not monks in training. Rather, this is philosophy concerned with how to live a good life. And, as I read the analects again after all these years, I am struck by the way in which something in the project feels somehow very similar to the project of poetry:

to never deny desire or emotion-- but to refine it like art

Saying this to Beijing, I wasn't necessarily saying that through the Rites or study that all desire or emotion should be civilized as to be no longer recognizable as such (sublimated in the form of archery, for example). But rather, more like poetry, that emotion is refined and moderated. 

**

Anyway, the readers of these pages will all be interested to learn that through my travels in this blog-- I have come to re-think my previously-held dark-and-gloomy conviction that people are no longer able to be swept away by things, or to be really moved by someone or something. 

Some of you will recall that the philosopher I work for in Hiroshima is very interested in a German thinker named Wolfgang Welsch (who teaches at Schiller University at Jena). I have written about his work in greater length here (or better here), but Welsch writes a lot about what he characterizes as our contemporary focus on "amusement and the virtual."

This from his Undoing Aesthetics:
 
In surface aestheticization the most superficial aesthetic aesthitic value dominates:  pleasure, amusement, enjoyment without consequence. This animatory trend today reaches far beyond the aesthetic enshroudment of individual everyday items-- beyond the styling of objects and experience-loaded ambiances. It is increasingly determining the form of our culture as a whole. Experience and entertainment have become the guidelines in recent years. A society of leisure and experience is served by an expanding culture of festivals and fun. And whilst some of the all too strident offshoots of aestheticization, or singular aspects of the cosmetics of reality, might raise a smile, with its extension to culture as a whole, this is no longer a laughing matter. 

What is interesting about this phenomena--beyond the obvious resulting anti-intellectualism and philistinism-- is that there is a "leveling;" whereby "experience" and "having fun" (entertainment) create what Welsch calls the Disneylandification of our emotional experiences-- that is to say: everything loses its depth.

To be emotionally carried away-- or moved-- by music; by beauty; by art; or to be carried away by another person (in love); to be carried away by landscape somehow seem to be retreating outside our ability to experience.

**

Travel back in time 1000 years.

There meet a young man who writes of falling so deeply in love that he is unable to function--indeed, he can barely breath. Maybe he would say falling in love with that woman was like a thermonuclear meltdown in his heart...

Totally impressed, I recall the words of a friend, who once wrote that

Our passions are like the sail”, a generic Hindu guru once said, “and our reason — like the rudder. Without the latter, the boat will founder; but without the first, it won’t go anywhere.”

This is very much how I think of the Master's advice. I mean, even the southern song landscapes that I love so much-- while they may have been called "untrammeled"-- in fact, they were moderated and refined expressions of emotion plus reasoned restraint (but remember the boat ain't going anywhere without the passion part).

Finally, over a bowl of noodles, I ask Adonis' father what he thinks about the passage. Immediately, he responds,

"Sex is the worst translation"

"Why?" I ask (though I already know exactly what he is going to say).

"Because 色　is not 遊び and in the end, it doesn't matter whether the person acts on their feelings or not-- it can all be inside his own mind and still be 色。” And then after another few slurps of noodles he says, 心の動き、それだけ。("it's all about being moved")

Amour

**

From Beijing, who says that this is probably the real context of 15.13: The Romance of Nan Zi 

And, for Beijing: A slide show here with some good shots of the 新光戲院

Photo above is one of Jim Gourley's Top 40 China Photos. This particular one is one of my personal favorites.

And speaking of photographers I like, here is Michael Wolf (I've been wanting to buy his book of hong Kong photographs for some time) Architecture of Density is HongKong and Transparent City is Chicago.

 

confucian virtue (and the man who dwells above the clouds)

 

My friend Beijing was in Tokyo for a conference. I wanted to take him over to see the famous Confucian temple, Yushima Seido (湯島聖堂）, so after an unforgettable lunch with Beijing's truly unforgettable friend, I-Sensei, the three of us headed over to Ochanomizu. The temple is located not far from the university hospital where we take Adonis for his eye treatment. After some bad news, about three months ago, we wandered over to the temple, but that day I was just worried and stressed and the truth is, I hardly looked around at all (I just wanted to go home). The stark black building, however, had stuck in my mind, and I knew I definitely wanted to show it to Beijing. I-Sensei seemed to like the idea, and taking full charge of everything, we headed off by taxi.

I am sure Beijing would agree that Yushima Seido is quite unique-- as far as Confucian temples go. The most impressive Confucian temple I have ever seen was in Tainan (considered the Kyoto of Taiwan). The Tainan Confucian Temple is very old and really very beautiful. Maybe because of its long history or because of the more southern climate, but my impressions of the place are more concerned with the gardens which were full of people drinking tea and children playing than the architecture. When I was there, there was just so much activity going on.

In contrast, Yushima Seido is actually rather imposing, silent and somehow cold or inaccessible. Painted a rich shade of black, the building itself, I-Sensei explained, was designed by one of Japan's most famous modern architects, Chuta Ito. (The original Edo period structure had been destroyed in the fires resulting from the Kanto earthquake).

Beijing wondered, why is it black? Indeed, the color is what leaves the strongest impression. I-Sensei immediately questioned the lady in charge of the ticket counter who informed us that originally the building had been painted vermilion but that the red reminded the local residents of the fire that had taken so many lives so it was decided to paint the new temple black instead. I-Sensei pointed to the figures decorating the roof and said, "Where in Japan would you ever see figurines like that on the roof?" Looking up, sure enough there were gargoyles like you would see on Nortre Dame looking down at us.

**

Walking up the stairs toward the gate, Beijing asked me (with what could possibly have been a mischieveous look in his eyes) how things were going on the blogs the past view days. I told him that I am still not crazy about his preference for Ivanhoe's translation of 徳 as "moral power," and I went on to tell him about Shirakawa's take on the origins of the character; basically re-iterating my comment here:

徳: first taking the kanji apart: we have →　"straight" （直）＋　heart/mind"（心）　＋　"go"（行）
Hence: move with straight heart; move from the natural 直 disposition of one's heart (which you will notice is actually saying "moral force" only if you equate morality not with universal moral law but rather with an intuitive sense that humans have).

Shizuka Shirakawa, by the way, was Japan's leading expert on the etymology of the Chinese characters via his research on oracle bone script. The wikipedia article on the origins of the character 徳 was based on Shirakawa's work:

白川静によると甲骨文字では大きな目の上に装飾をかぶった形であり、司祭王の目による呪力で土地を抑えることを意味し、それがやがて統治者としての資質や自然万物を育成する力を表していったと考えられる。

According to Shirakawa, in the oracle bones script, the character was written as a large "eye" with a decorative head-gear signifying the magical power (mystical force) of the early shaman kings who had the power to control earth. In later times, the kanji came to signify the force that a ruler had to cultivate resources and nurture and draw out 自然万物.

Beijing immediately complained: Well obviously the sage kings were using their mystical power to control earth in a "moral" way, right? I tried to ask him how he would define moral, but unfortunately we had arrived at out destination.

**

What is interesting is that at this exact moment when the three of us were stepping into the Hall of the Confucian Temple in Tokyo, on the other side of the galaxy-- far, far away-- a certain Manyul Im was writing a blog post on On de 德 and se 色. Taking issue with the standard translation of 色　as sex (see Talking to Beijing), he says:

I think se 色 really can’t mean something as narrow as sex or lust; its meaning is much broader, expressing a broader more central concern in the Analects. The “sex” translation seems flat out wrong for the following reasons. There really isn’t any independent evidence that sexual license was a temptation Confucius worried over. Nor does it seem that concubinage was an option for anyone other than the emperor or possibly a very powerful warlord (any ancient Chinese concubinage experts should correct or corroborate me on this). This line of translating seems to be a projection of much later genres of moralizing texts onto the Analects. But those issues about sexual desire and practice don’t really determine the issue as much as consideration of a more central concern for Confucius. In Analects 2.8 Confucius uses se in a context that I think is much more helpful in setting our understanding of se in the right direction:

子夏問孝。子曰：“色難。有事弟子服其勞，有酒食先生，曾是以為孝乎？”

“Zixia asked about filial piety. The Master said: ‘[Mere] appearances (se) are the difficulty. With matters to be tended, younger brothers or sons offer their service; with drink and food one partakes in order of birth. Can this really be filial piety?’”

I think this is representative of a concern that Confucius has throughout the Analects with contrasting mere, or rote, behavior that mimics real filial piety (or righteousness, benevolence, ritual, etc) and genuine possession of those characteristics. It’s his concern that the “form” of such activity be filled out with deeper content or correct context. I think that transfers also to distractions that form a category of “surface” pleasure. Appreciation of beauty, in particular, is not a mere surface pleasure for Confucius. So translation of se as ‘love of beauty’ also makes a mistake–the real trouble for Confucius is not appreciating beauty; instead it is enjoying “cheap” delights that merely mimic appreciation of beauty.

As I mentoned in the comments to his post, I am in no position to go against the orthodox interpretation of this reading when it is so overwhelmingly unified (that is to say, that the English, Japanese and Chinese that I've seen so far all agree that 色 should be translated here as romance or sex) So, what can I say? At the same time, I am very much of the same mind with Manyul that --indeed-- Confucius probably was NOT concerned with sex, romance or beauty as being "dangers" which the virtuous man must avoid. This is not Stoic philosophy-- nor is it Victorian sensibility, after all. 

That is probably my main point over these several posts (and perhaps it is Manyul's as well?)

What is most probably at issue is rather: Mere outward forms (形→色） versus 徳 (inner commitment?) This, by the way, I think very much supports Sam's translation of 徳 as "integrity."  

In the end, Manyul and I came up with this translation:

"It is rare to find a man who pursues virtue over mere outward appearances (of such virtue)” for 9.18/15.13.

For those who may be interested, I also summarized Shirakawa's presentation of the origins of the term （徳）from his book, 孔子伝　here (mainly for Scott since he asked and honestly, I am guessing that for you all-- the experts-- there really is not much of interest so far). Shirakawa's presentation, however, does back up both the understanding of Confucian Virtue as "integrity" as well as "moral power." In fact, after reading it, I would have a hard time choosing between those two translations

I myself am going to stick with "Confucian Virtue" as a translation for 徳.

**

Tokyo.

In Japanese, he would be called a "man who dwells above the clouds." Beijing's friend, I-Sensei, is like nobility ("the elite of the elite"). He also is a really nice guy, and taking us to a favorite restaurant of his for lunch, he ordered all the best delicacies for Beijing and me to try.

Did I mention that Beijing is very adventurous?

He didn't blink an eye when I-Sensei pushed a plate of "sea cucumber intestines, marinated" in front of us, and when I refused, Beijing said: "What are you just off the boat?"

I told him, I never do intestines. (I don't and I won't) 

Well, sure enough this morning I woke up to an email from I-Sensei which ended with a mild scolding: 食は冒険です。("Food is about adventure") and he then extemporized a "humble aphorism:"

小生の格言：　人間とは、その人がこれまで食べてきたものの総体である。

"A human being is the sum total of everything they have eaten up till that time"... 

Now, I ask you: what would Confucius say to that?  

 ** 

Here is a video of the Yushima Seido taken in summer (you can hear all the cicadas in the background). When we were there it was cold and overcast, but the plum tree in the courtyard was just starting to bloom.

**

For those interested in participating in the 2nd reading group, Chris put up all the information at his place: Reading Group II: Fingarette's Confucius-- the more the merrier!

Going Visiting with Daniel Bell (part 2)

Today, I am back in my rickety boat with all the gaping holes in the bottom, drifting into deep-- and for me-- very unchartered waters. I know I should turn back-- but it's this or go back to work. So I leave you this page, dear readers, asking for your understanding that I write in the spirit of questioning-- not answering.

**

Right off, many of you will notice the object of my desire-- at left. Imagine him here not as a victorious athlete, but rather as Meno's slave. We know that our man from Thessaly arrived on a trip to Athens with a large retinue of slaves. One of these slaves became forever after immortalized in Plato's Socratic dialogue, the Meno. Clever, he was perhaps also very handsome (that's how I like to imagine him, at least).

And so, during the course of a pleasant dialogue that occurred between Meno, and then his slave and Socrates, we learn that, according to Plato, the purpose of all dialogue-- indeed the aim of education itself-- is to recover the knowledge that already exists within us. Learning, then, is a kind of recollection; so that Truth, rather than being knowledge deducted empirically from the world around us, exists a priori within all of us and is knoweable through human reason.

As I mentioned here, I have been re-listening to Dreyfus' lectures on Kierkegaard. In the first lecture Dreyfus talks about the scene in the Meno in which Socrates teaches a foreign-born slave how to solve the Pythagorean Theorem. Socrates, by asking the slave a series of questions leads him to rationally come up with the solution to the theorem; thereby, declares Plato, proving that knowledge is innate. Dreyfus then goes on to explain that not only does Plato prove that truths are universal (not dependent on context) but also that Greek civilization and the heights of its cultural achievements (effective utilization of human reason) were in fact open to everyone (as long as they spoke Greek perhaps?) A slave yes, but even still participation in culture was open to him.

**

Now, fast forward 2500 years into the future. My buddy in Beijing and I are debating once again about Daniel Bell (disguised in the form of Samuel Huntington). I wanted to make the point (which I stand by) that universalist thinking is strongly inherent to Western philosophical and religious traditions. But again, this is not to say that 1) the Western tradition is exclusively or categorically universalist; nor is it to 2) deny universalist approaches that exist in other cultures. Still, I would argue that Western political and moral discourse tends to couch its principles as universal and objective truth.

My buddy in Beijing, however, urged me to not be so quick to discount strains of universalism in Chinese thought as well, and mentioned the famous Mencius episode where the philosopher argues for the innate goodness of humans.

Here is the wiki version:

To show innate goodness, Mencius used the example of a child falling down a well. Witnesses of this event immediately feel

“ alarm and distress, not to gain friendship with the child's parents, nor to seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor because they dislike the reputation [of lack of humanity if they did not rescue the child]...
The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of humanity; the feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness; the feeling of deference and compliance is the beginning of propriety; and the feeling of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom.

Is this the same quality of universalism seen in the Meno, though?

That Mencius is positing that all human beings would feel a similar compassion for a child in mortal danger is "universalist" of course in the sense that he is saying that this is a trait which all humans share by virtue of our shared humanity. But are all shared human traits universalist in the philosophical sense (ie, a truth derived from human reason which can be universally applied despite context)?

That is my question.

I have no real answer, because I have not read enough Mencius. I will just briefly explain my concerns (with regard to this particular passage only) and then hope one of you will leave a comment to give me something to think about regarding this issue.

My first concern I have already stated above: aren't shared human traits (even universally shared human traits) somehow fundamentally different from Plato's innate knowledge as truth? This is really slippery to me.... because, of course, Mencius' position is based on an innate concept of virtue-- and that perhaps could fall under the aegis of innate knowledge. Except if I were to accept that Mencius' concept of innate virtue is a form of innate knowledge, I would want to make sure this can be differentiated from other shared human traits-- for example those derived from instinct or emotion. So, out first question should be to ask, what is Mencius' innate virtue based on?

Mencius makes it clear that he is basing his argument on feeling-- not rationally-derived a priori concepts. And, this is my problem. It's not that all people rationally know that having compassion for a child in mortal danger is virtuous. Rather it is something we all feel. It is a shared (ie "universal") human trait. The Chinese is 心 xin, which I assume is the same meaning as the Japanese (heart/mind) and it appears a lot! And what does the heart mind do? It feels or is thoughtful (思う）-- differentaited from sense perception (感覚→　感觉）as well as from rational thinking 考.

Like sense perceptions and like rationality, however, feeling is something bequeathed to all humans by nature 天. And, it is through the functioning of feeling, or thoughtfulness, that one arrives at virtuous action 徳. 

Is this knowledge? 

I would argue (based on my reading of this passage as well as my understanding of the Japanese) that even if Mencius was referring to "knowing," that this "knowing" is based fundamentally on one's heart-felt/embodied (心）engagement （得） with the world (in contrast to Platonic a priori notions which are not based on knowledge obtained from the senses or feelings, etc.)

This, therefore, leads to the point of my question: Yes, the child in a well episode posits a human universalism, but my feeling is, being based on 1) human feeling and 2) engagement with the world-- that the universalism we see in this particular Mencius passage is not based on a priori concepts of Truth (as in Plato)-- but rather has more in common with other shared human traits (such as the universalism of falling in love). And, it is this linking of universal principles with truth via Greek rationality that we see in Plato and that characterizes the Western philosophical tradition, which would lead Dreyfus to state that

Plato proves that Greek civilization and the heights of its cultural achievements were in fact open to everyone; a slave yes, but even still participation in culture was open to him.

Indeed, I do not think Mencius' episode carries the same weight (for to say that, "you must do x, because it is something we all inherently feel" is an altogether different kettle of fish than to say, "you must do x because it is objectively Right." The former has a much stronger emphasis on dialogue and varying emphases depending on time and place, for example (as logically speaking, if something is true than it is so despite context).

**

Has everyone read Chris' really interesting post called Embracing Your Inner Elitist? I left a comment to his post trying to make a very similar point with regard to Bell's House of Scholars versus Plato's Philosopher-Kings. While at a glance Bell's advance of a "House of Scholars" is reminiscent of Plato's philosopher-kings, in fact, while Plato's ideas are derived ultimately from universal principles (expounded as truth) we do not see the same claims in Bell (disguised as Mencius); and being based in time (historicity) and location (culture), I really do think Bell's ideas are more fluid and open to various interpretations and applications than we are seeing in reviews etc. 

Having said all this, I guess I had better explicitly state the following (otherwise Shunya is sure to call me on it): while I do think there is a significant difference between universally shared ethical traits versus universal principles which are "true  in all possible contexts," this is not to say that I think Chinese culture is particularly exclusionary. Like any other cultures, I think Chinese culture is ever-changing and multi-faceted-- hence it remains flexible and indeed open. But, not unlike French civilization, I think access to it remains dependent on the acceptance (and acquisition) of language, values and cultural practices.

**

Finally, one last point, on East Meets West: Bell takes a huge risk by delivering his ideas in a Socratic dialogue. Some have felt a strong aversion to this format, but I think it should be remembered that a philosophical dialogue has different aims than literature and while the characters (Demo, Lo et al) are every bit as one-dimensional as Socrates, Meno and the slave, still the format is employed with a commitment to seeing truth as occurring in the dialectic. This is something that Chris has brought up several times (if I am understanding him correctly, that is). I think it is a great point-- and it one that I share.

(See my post: Going Visiting with Hannah Arendt).

If no one has read this book (Moral Foundations: Mencius versus Kant, Rousseau & Nietzshe) by Francois Jullien, I may try and get a copy in Japanese-- but I've got to tell you, I would much prefer to read it in English (has it not been translated?) The child in a well anecdote appears right on the cover and his other books look interesting.... any thoughts?

Three Generations of Human Rights

    

"Neither nature, experience, nor probability informs these lists of 'entitlements', which are subject to no constraints except those of the mind and appetite of their authors." -- Jeane Kirkpatrick talking about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which she termed "a letter to Santa Claus."

Chris-in-a-rush sends me this (above) in an email this morning. To me, it really touches upon a point that I find interesting and worth considering. And that is while Kirkpatrick is positing that the UN's declaration is based solely on the particular philosophical perspectives of those persons who formulated the declaration, it remains dubious whether she realizes that the same, in fact, holds for her own perspective. Really, this is to ask the question why (or under what authority) the right to gather or the right of free speech is in any way more fundamental or inalienable than say the right for clean water and nutritious food-- or universal healthcare? And, more, is there really such a thing as natural rights- and if so, under what authority?

It always comes back to the same example, but Kirkpatrick was a famous petitioner against authoratarianism. But how does one respond when the world's largest democracy is so mired in corruption that an unforgivable percentage of its population lives in abject poverty. Is the right to vote in fact somehow more desirable-- or more a moral imperative-- than the right to food?

The Europeans seem to consider all of the above essential human rights. Other regions , however, focus on certain rights over others. And, this is a significant point that both Daniel Bell and Parag Khanna have been working to address (and again, Khanna in particular I think does a great job here).

And, it's true that I can no longer abide by utilitarians.

More to the point, perhaps, is that I suppose personally I just don't have real libertarian tendancies. So, in that way, when I think about the issue of Three Generations of Human Rights, I tend to categorically value all of them-- but especially the 2nd generation ones.

My new friend Phil rightly says that in the EU one does not have to lose social welfare rights to gain individual liberty ones-- and I too think this is the ideal. Japan, as well, I think does a very good job at simultaneously safeguarding many of the 1st and 2nd generation rights. However, reading Bell's book (which is translated into japanese under the title, Asian Values & Liberal Democracy-- A Dialogue between East and West) I have felt so far that his ideas about both Confucianism and Communitarianism could also be appropriately applied to japan.

This is from a comment I left for Phil:

Concerning East Asian communitarianism, I do agree with Bell that in japan it is the focus-- both legally and culturally-- that issues which benefit the greater number of people will take precedent over the protection of individual rights. So, that in Japan, economic and social rights are prioritized over political/personal liberty rights for example. People argue that because Japan is a basically racially homogeneous society that things are just less complicated (that is they don't face the same challenges as a multi-ethnic pluralistic society). Maybe, but this ignores the point that society is set up very differently in Japan as compared to the US (and I am only comparing to the US right now).

Japan has outstanding universal medical care. Education is
egalitarian (budgets not decided by property taxes etc. all public schools have similar conditions), there are all kinds of economic protections for families, home owners, etc. Of course, it is not perfect, and compared to certain parts of the EU there are real lagging areas, at the same time, I would say these kinds of communal welfare issues are prioritized over and above individual legalistic protections (disrimination)

Here in LA, I am in a neighborhood )with pretty stringent community codes that keeps people from annoying each other (no painting your house blue or hanging out your laundry)... in Japan, there is no real legal recourse for issues at the commnuity level. We belong to neighborhood associations (and children's associations, and wife's associations ) to get things done. So, that things are done by consensus at this community level. Divorce too is much different in Japan (much more use of mediation using "community elders" before a divorce is even granted if both sides are not in agreement).. the list could go on and on.

On the other hand, there are gray areas with regard to censorship and things like wire tapping/listening in on phone calls, rights if you are arrested... all kinds of personal liberty issues in Japan are what I would call as gray. Media and business are much tighter with government-- which is run in a rather paternalistic fashion. This year the director of Shall we dance has a new film out about individual liberty issues for those accused of a crime. And this does not in any way mean that japanese people do not care about these political or personal liberty issues. Not at all. Just that the stress is placed more strongly on issues of communal welfare.

**

So to respond to Alan Baumler's question of what I am enjoying about the book, I would say that it is Bell's overall commitment to pushing back the boundaries of "western academic and cultural presumptions." I wrote about this at length here, particularly my interest with regard to linking this to the work of a professor whose work I translate in the field of aesthetics. Related to this is the question of social welfare as a human right-- which Bell brings up. I guess I am less interested in the Asian values versus liberal democracy debate as I am in Bell's overall philosophical project.

With regard to Bell's presentation of Asia in generalized terms. I understand your point, Alan. I cannot agree, however, as I am still in his China section so everything I have read till now has been confined to China. And again, I do not see describing China as Confucian as any more problematic than defining US society as being informed by Enlightenement philosophy and Protestantism (city on a hill). Having said this, though, I would be interested in learning Bell's stance on  Charter 08.

I can imagine what he would say, but I don't really know.

This book remains about means not ends (but I say that being only part-way through the book!)

*

Painting at top by another favorite Vietnamese painter, Le Thiet Cuong.

 

East Meets West in Constantinople

My debates with my friend Shunya have taken on a formalized quality-- not all that unlike that of ritualized dance. I play my role as he plays his; we dance round and round; always ending up in the same place-- seemingly unendingly prepared and willing to dance yet again. 

While not a universalist by any means, Shunya hesitates to see human rights too firmly grounded in local culture-- for he asks (always sensibly, I think)

 Is it reasonable to think of Chinese culture as a single entity and resisting all judgment in the name of a pluralism of world cultures? Aren't there many contending forces within Chinese society--struggles and sufferings and countless interplays of power and dominance? Why should we not take sides and show solidarity based on our own values? Is there any reason to think that the present Chinese government is an organic expression of its people?

It is hard to argue really. Except-- well, I do argue.

Shunya, you see, is taking the more rigorous path. He is trying to come up with a constructive understanding of how things should be.

I, on the other hand, remain focused only on what they shouldn't. And, like Bell, I have deep problems with the detached (impartial) universalist approach. Why? Because the impartial approach is not only rarely impartial but in fact oftentimes it is downright parochial.

As I wrote here,

I do think there are many places, which I shall call the Old World countries, where people remain quite conscious of the way in which their culture is unique and non-transferable; while there are other places, which I shall call New World countries, which are shaped by utopian, philosophical notions in which they see their way of life as having model-like qualities-- something to which all cultures could if they so desired strive toward; even in some cases, seeing the modern liberal democratic way as being the culmination of enlightened development.

And herein lies the tension.

Shunya agrees but asks: How can one not impose one's cultural values while at the same time refrain from siding with the executioners?

There are many possible answers to this question-- and I like all of you have come to my own conclusions regarding this. And, like Bell's my conclusions remain firmly committed to a culturally-informed approach.

(This being the main point, I think, of Part 1 of his book).

As many of the readers of these pages will recall, I recently read Parag Khanna's tour de force book, The Second World. Khanna in his book, makes the very crucial point that if the US wishes to continue playing a leadership role in the world, it might have to accept the fact that it is no longer the only game in town; and that, the world is no longer in a post-Cold War state of being whereby there are only two choices to choose from: our way or the highway.

Rather now, in what Khanna calls the geopolitical marketplace, up and coming developing countries, as well as other First World Countries for that matter, can "shop around" and choose to align themselves with one of several superpowers-- or better: align themselves with more than one at the same time- keeping things interesting.

According to Khanna, currently there are three superpowers that stand as empires: the US, the EU and China. So, for example, nowadays a "second world" country in Central Asia might wish to take on aspects of China's "communitarian" traditions (which stress collective welfare and stable, centralized government over over individual, political rights, etc.).

With this in mind, of particularly note, I think is the EU, which has done tremendous work in pushing forward international standards in everything from the environment to human rights. The EU approach,  which could characterize as being both cosmopolitan as well consensus-style, is in all probability the way of the future as far as the watch-guarding over the worst kinds of abuses. I think we will also see a further "shopping around" when it comes to this issue of human rights as well, so that, indeed, there will be nations that will choose to place a priority on collective welfare, economic and property rights over that of a US-led "political and civil rights centrism" (for example).

**

Candide.

He traveled far and wide-- and wherever he went he was confronted by great hardship and evil. The problem of evil. In the end, you will recall, he met a charming Turk in Constantinople who invites him home and offers him homemade sherbets of cream flavored with candied citron, orange, lemon, lime, pineapple, pistachio and some mocha coffee, and Candide says to him that he must possess an enormous and splendid property. The Turk answers, No, I only have twenty acres that I cultivate with my family and the work keeps us from the three great evils: boredom, vice, and poverty.

Professor Pangloss is going on about how "All events are linked together in the best of all possible worlds" ("there cannot possibly be an effect without a cause and that in this best of all possible worlds the Baron's castle was the best of all castles and his wife the best of all possible Baronesses" -- also known in other regions as Everything Happens For A Reason) and if Candide hadn't been kicked out of his homeland, if he hadn't gone up against the Inquisition, if he hadn't traveled across America on foot, if he hadn't killed a baron, if he hadn't lost all his sheep in Eldorado, well, then he wouldn't be sitting here eating some nice candied citron and pistachios in Constantinople.

To which Candide replies, That is very well put, but we must cultivate our garden. 

And people have debated ever since whether Voltaire was implying a passive retreat from the outer world to cultivate one's inner Self, or whether he was advocating productive occupation and engagement (in the form of gardening) with the world.

Like all gardens-- Candide's garden could symbolize just about anything-- and indeed, to my mind it does just that.

To remain committed and engaged-- but at the same time perhaps remembering that Candide's garden was in the end "his garden."  If an engaged commitment to peace and human rights is like a a beautiful Persian garden full of roses (and indeed I think it is), then I think there are two things that can be learned-- and these are Bell's points.

If the ultimate aim of human rights diplomacy is to persuade others of the value of human rights, then in my view the struggle is more likely to be won if it is fought in ways that build on, rather than challenge, local cultural traditions (55).

That is to say if you want to practice your gardening techniques in someone else's garden, it's probably not a bad idea to take into account local weather and soil conditions-- right? This is conservative advice. For a more critical look at the validity of the impartial voice in ethics (and life) I recommend Dreyfus' article on Kierkegaard and the Internet (which many of you know I love) or take a look at Bell's stance on The Impartiality of Justice.

The other is just to reiterate Candide's words that it is our own gardens that, in the end, we are called to cultivate. For there is no better way to persuade than as exemplary model-- which is really just to say that while a US approach will see gaps in the Chinese approach, so too will a EU approach see huge gaps in the US approach (who is speaking out for the rights of those without health care and food in inner cities?)  

Voltaire, for all his glorious candied citron, pistachios, and a love life that never quit, still remained in the end yet another monoglot philosopher. In that sense, I appreciate Daniel Bell-- and his "Confucian project" to push back our cultural blind spots, as I think that will continue to be our greatest challenge---- how to be embodied in more interesting ways.  

**

Thanks for reading!

Part 2 of the East Meets West reading will be meeting at Chris Panza's place-- so check there soon! (I will make an announcement here when it goes up).

amber dreams

   

Last night, I dreamt about political philosopher and Sinologist Daniel A. Bell. 

Let me preface that.

Bill and I are talking about reading one of Bell's books along with a certain, mysterious Professor A. Ku. Trying to decide between Bell's East Meets West or his Beyond Liberal Democracy, we are aiming to chat about the book here in mid-December and welcome others to join us. In the words of Bill, "the more the merrier."

To be totally up front about my own project (which of course I have), more than discussing how Bell's ideas can be mapped to western philosophical conventions, I am interested to see whether Bell illuminates the Asian perspective as a method within its own context. That, to me, is the only really interesting question-- how to push back the boundaries of our own ontological limitations (of which it seems we have many).

Anyone in? (How about it, Taipei, Chicago and Romania?)

Anyway, back to my dream. It was mid-Winter and Bell was in Tokyo for a lecture. I had agreed to pick him up at his hotel and escort him to the lecture hall and was racing through Tokyo Station thinking about the things I wanted to talk with him about. It was the morning rush hour and the station was packed with people rushing toward the exits in thick coats, bracing themelves again the northern wind which was howling outside.

I thought, I really would like to know if the recent huge down-turn in Japanese public opinion toward China was making the news in China-- or whether America remains the main issue on people's minds (the elephant in the room that everyone is still talking about?).

And does the public opinion reflect what is happening on a governmental level? The gyoza scare was huge here and it took a really very ugly turn I thought. Despite that, I seem to recall recently reading that Japanese investments in China were at an all-time high.

Just the other week at a Ladies Lunch (I remain convinced that ladies lunches are things that go on for eternity in hell), the ladies turned to the topic of China and you know things are really bad when your Japanese friends start talking like this, but wow, even I was speechless. Not that I disagreed with anything they were saying: from the environment to contaminates in the food everything was hidoi (terrble and unbelivable). At the same time, looking around the table, I did take note that it was the ladies who gave their kids the greatest volume of cheap plastic toys made in China or bought the ready-made food who were complaining the loudest. Because, in fact, this was only an issue to them because it was directly affecting them-- but, of course, it would not be directly affecting them if they had chosen to purchase with more conscience (there you have it-- a Peony opinion, for what its worth). 

Anyway as I located Bell's hotel room and was about to knock at the door, I wondered if he would have much to say about this-- or if he had noticed the avalanche of Japanese books devoted to this topic of a dangerous, rising China that have been published over the past year. My words, however, got caught in my throat for when he opened the door, he had in his hands this gigantic piece of amber. Behind him, the curtains were open and a strong shaft of light was hitting the amber just right too, for it was glowing. And, there in the middle of the honey colored, glimmering chunk of amber was a million year old red bug.

What could this mean, I wondered? (Even in my dream it was all so unexpected).

He said that he wanted to get his coat and as he put it on, I noticed that his briefcase was also full of amber. And like happens in dreams, the golden honey color just infused the entire room with color and warm fragrance.

"But I thought you were here to talk about China?"

"No," I am here to talk about my new theory."

I waited for him to tell me what (knowing it must have something to do with that piece of amber in his hands).

"The Three Kings from the East, the Magi, they didn't bring frankiscence, myrrh and gold. What they brought with them on their long trek to the King was frankiscence, myrrh and amber."

**

And that was it. I woke up.

**

Before I went away to college, I attended a lecture series held at the Jung Institute in Los Angeles. It was really very interesting as maybe a dozen or so Jungian scholars and therapists gave various lectures about myths and dreams. I wonder how they would have interpreted my dream-- for it actually left me puzzled.

When I woke up, though, I recalled something I had glanced on NHK a few months ago-- a documentary about Poland. There was the most beautiful castle, not the kind of castle that kings build in times of peace, but a real Medieval castle of the type that gets built in times of siege. Called Malbork Castle, this fortress during part of its long history had its fate tied up with the amber trade-- and indeed, I think the Amber Road might well have ended up in Poland.

Mined along the Baltic, vast amounts of amber traveled along the Amber Road all the way to Rome during the time of the Empire. It also traveled East along the Silk Road-- maybe as far as China (amber was valued for its medicinal properties in the Middle East and perhaps in China as well).The castle now has an amber museum that the Japanese documentary described as being rather important (this amber Hermes is from there, circa 1600)

Not all that far from Malbork, in fact, a Polish Count I know was born and raised till he was maybe 12 or 13. He used to like to call me Atalanta. I liked that very much-- but not for the same reasons as he did.

You may recall the story of Meleager. The Fates had decried that he would only live until that moment when a brand in the family hearth was consumed by the fire. Trying to put off what fate had decided, his mother grabbed the brand and hid it away so that he might lead a long life.

You know fate, though.

Some intrigue involving Atalanta-- whom he probably loved-- led to a violent argument with his uncles, whereby he ended up killing them both. Enraged that her son would kill her brothers, his mother tossed the brand into the fire. He died that instant. His sisters were heartbroken and it is said that their tears turned to amber falling unendingly from their eyes.

Have you ever cried like that? Where even your tears felt heavy-- thick like amber.

**

I wish I could explain that mysterious utterance of Bell's. I have no idea what it means-- though I do love a mystery. I also find myself rather fascinated with tree saps and resins lately.

Between two large projects, I've been trying to finish up a blog post-- part two of Two Emperors and a Shogun-- This time, I'm writing about a great Japanese emperor of the 8th century. Emperor Shomu and his court lived in an exquisite cloud of aromatics; a truly dream-like world of perfumed baths and robes infused with the scent of precious incense brought from the exotic lands to the west.

It's all the stuff of Edward Schafer legend.

There was aloeswood, camphor, and sandalwood from Southeast Asia; cinnamon and musk from Vietnam and Frankinscence from Somiland. Cloves were used to freshen the breath. These aromatics were used to treat both body and spirit as they affected-- according to Professor Schafer-- the totality of the person: body, mind and soul.

One of Emperor Shomu's most valued possessions-- a gift from the Tang court-- was a piece of aloeswood. So precious was this piece of incense, it was given a name: Ranjatai. Only about 61 inches long, the piece of diseased wood weighs some 25 pounds! Native to the aquilaria tree of Southeast Asia, aloeswood has been an important item of trade for centuries and centuries. The tree alone does not produce the wood for incense, however, as the miraculous perfume is only created when an aquilaria tree is infected with a fungus. It is this infection that produces the fragrant resin-like substance. The fragrance is deeply penetrating and is usually described as warm and woody.

The small chips of diseased wood are permeated with this resin, which is what gives it its miraculous perfume, which in this case has lasted 1500 years (It's still stored in Shosoin today).

More similar to myrrh, perhaps, the main ingredient of violin varnish is also resin (which are the solids found in tree sap). There are three main types of resins: amber (made from fossilized sap up to 90 million years old), copal resins (crystallized sap from Mediterranean evergreen trees), and pitch. Made from the sap of a variety of pine species, including the Aleppo pine, it was this last one which was most probably what Stradavari and the other great Cremonese masters used for their varnish.

Adonis' violin probably has a synthetic varnish of course. However, the rosin he delights in using--golden Greek pitch--  is made from the same substance. Can you imagine? The finest, most exquisitely beautiful violin music depends on the delicate interaction of human hand with horsehair bow, sheep gut strings and pine sap.

Any interpretations of my dream?

Alchemy and dreams:
Dreaming of Tibet
Dreaming of Istanbul
Dreaming of Huizong
Dreaming of Daniel A. Bell