The Centrality of Central Asia

-- for Paul

I wonder how many of you recall my post on Tyrian purple? I ended it with a question-- which I will copy here:

Something has been bothering me about the way the silk road is sometimes held up as a symbol of something worth emulating for today's times. We see, for example, scholars in Europe (UNESCO scholars) nostalgically discussing silk road exchanges as a "two way street" where, perhaps in contrast to monoculturalization or super-power monologues of today, silk road influence functioned more along the lines like true dialogue. (And, how much of this is being romanticized is not really the point as the interesting thing is not the historical accuracy, but rather what contemporary phenomenon it is being contrasted with).

In history books as well, there is a stress on the manner in which trade led the way for these exchanges. And, sometimes when I read, while I feel that there is an implied contrast at how things occur in today's world, I am left with questions.

Aren't international exchanges even today based on trade? Or has the financial world changed to such an extent that true two-way trade doesn't really exist any longer? But, we know that huge trade imbalances existed during Roman times. Pliny (I seem to recall) took pains to complain about Roman trade deficits with India. Purple silk was banned in part for this reason in ancient Rome (being reserved for the emperor). But, if it is not contemporary trade imbalances, what then is being implied?

Last month, Sam Crane had a post over at his place called Finance is Immoral, in which he wrote:

Decades ago, "finance" was generally understood as financing something other than finance itself; that is, stocks and bonds and money were tied to the production and circulation of goods and services, which were for the most part tangible, or "real" in economic parlance.  Beginning with at least the oil crisis of the 1970s, finance has been transformed, now stunningly overshadowing the "real" economy.   Left academics have coined the term "Financialization" to get at these changes.  How big has finance become?  That is a difficult question but think about this kind of statement (from the above linked Wikipedia page):

Thus, [in 2006] derivatives trading – mostly futures contracts on interest rates, foreign currencies, Treasury bonds, etc had reached a level of $1,200 trillion, $1.2 quadrillion, a year. By comparison, U.S. GDP in 2006 was $12.456 trillion.

     Indeed, this week "trillion" has become a common reference.  How big is the market in credit default swaps?  We hear reports in the tens of trillions.  Government action valued in the hundreds of billions seems puny by comparison.  Welcome to the world of financialization.

Sam asks, what would Mencius think? I think it's a good question.

**

I have finally gotten my hands on a book I've been wanting to read for several months now by Andre Gunder Frank, called The Centrality of Central Asia. The book remains an important work on both Central Asian history and on what is the more or less neglected field of "global history." The more I read about his life and his work, the more fascinated I become with Frank and this particular book is short but has all kinds of really interesting insights. And, being associated with the UNESCO scholars, he was for a time involved in UNESCO'S Silk Road Project.

One of Frank's main aims in the book is to bring out the way in which "trade both preceded and exceeded diplomacy;" so that the term "international trade" is probably unfortunate since it implies that international trade came into existence after nations did-- as some kind of trans-"national" trade. Frank says however, that in fact, ancient peoples-- with a few notable exceptions-- were organized along tribal loyalties with various shifting alliances which were not necessarily based on territory. And that even if the tribal groupings became organized within a larger empire, that people for the most part probably continued to associate along these more locally -based groupings. 

(Perhaps an ancient times a man from the Kingdom of Shu would in fact have considered himself not as a Chinese but a man from Shu? But in any case in Central Asia today, it is probably true that people identify themselves by their ethnic association rather than by their national/territorial identity).

Based on these smaller groupings, Frank says, people actively traded with one another, so that kingdoms, empires and nomadic groups (ethic associations) were much more symbiotic with each other than is apparent by reading modern history books. This is part of Frank's world system thesis (500 years or 5000?). And, it's true that it is always awe-inspiring to read about the way luxery items were traded up and down the silk road or around the Mediterrean, for example. Silks, horses, dyes, teas, slaves (particularly on the Western side), jade, pigments... and with these items came philosophies and religions. The amazingly speedy spread Islam in particular is associated with trade, but so too was Buddhism.

It almost seems ironic to be harkening back to this time so far back in history for its robust international trade and cosmopolitanism in our own age of globalization. If Frank is correct, humankind has been closely linked (symbiotically in some cases) for some 5000 years. Parag Khanna too holds up the silk road as one exemplery model for cosmopolitanism. He contrasts this with the strategic rivalry and international competition represented by the infamous Great Game, asking, what it's going to be for us in the future-- the silk road or another Great Game?

Frank gives numerous examples of the way the ancient civilazations were linked and the manner in which events during certain periods would have a ripple affect across the map. Here he quotes Beckwith on the Tang:

It is a curious fact that, unlike the proceeding and following centuries, the middle of the seventh and eighth centuries--specifically the period 742-755-- saw fundamental changes, usually signalled by successful political revolts, in every Eurasian empire. Most famous among them are the Carolignian, Abbasid, Uighur, Turkik, and the anti-Tang rebellions, each of which is rightly considered a watershed in the respective national histories. Significantly, they all seem to  have been intimately connected with Central Eurasia (1987)

And this leads to Frank's main point (as suggested by the title of the book) which is Central Asia has has a longtime central role in the history of the world, and that it remains--thanks to the massive amounts of oil and natural gas discovered there-- strategically key. Indeed, it sometimes feels as if all roads truly lead back to Oxiana.

So, these topics remain on my mind, and I still am not exactly sure how to approach them:
silk road trade versus contemporaray finance
silk road cosmopolitanism versus contemporary globalization
silk road international relations versus the Great Game

The Centrality of Central Asia (1992)/ Frank's website

Comments

[Chris]

Peony,

I know so little about this topic, so I don't have anything particularly interesting to add. Still, it's very intriguing!

I wonder if modern claims about globalization would lead to a reinvention of the silk road? The claim, in any effect, seems to be that economics reaches further than the nation-state, and so globalization causes a withdrawal (inevitably) of barriers to trade. This sounds to me like a reversion to the time when, as you note, economic forces were organized around communities smaller than countries.

A stray thought: is the extension of MFN status to China an example of an attempt to bring about change by the silk road as opposed to the great game? I can't help but to think that the days of the Great Game are numbered.

On Sam's post: the subject of his post, and your discussion of it, always leads me to wonder about the connection (or lack of one) between profit and virtue (in Mencius or Confucius or whoever). Sam's post seems to imply a kind of incompatibility between the two. I sensed a similar suggestion in Alan's post on the sex trade -- that attraction to sex was antithetical to virtue (both seeming to rest of what is petty or corresponding to personal advantage).

I am unconvinced by both. My feeling here is that Confucianism is not against either. A person who lives virtuously should do pretty well in life, in all of these ways. Focus on profit (or sex) isn't a bad thing. It's the way that one can focus on these things in a vicious way that is concerning. Sex, profit, and virtue are compatible, but can easily come into conflict -- hence the need to be very attentive to one's way of engaging with them.

But I'm digressing here, as this is off your point!

[Peony]

Chris, thank you so much for responding to this post as it has been something that has been on my mind for months. Is globalization bringing about a situation whereby trade preceeds diplomacy? Or does strategy and universalist practices define contemporary trade (I am sorry how could I resist that, really?)

What is the significance of Sam's discussion of financialization?

Regarding Confucian virtue versus sex and profit... well, I know what the existentialist would say(!!)

Bell too talks about the civilizing practices of the sex culture of east Asia...

I'm not sure...

[Sam]

Hello Peony!
Sorry I have not yet jumped into the discussion on Bell. Between the end of the semester and the holidays I have been fairly overwhelmed.
There's a lot in this post for me. (Ask me some time about the time when I was a callow first year grad student in Madison giving my first conference paper and Frank, as discussant, torn me to shreds...). Frank is a really interesting figure, in that he moved intellectually over his lifetime, from a rather rigid "dependency theory" to a more open-ended historicity. We should all be so flexible.
As to the historical contrasts that you raise at the very end of the post, I think a key difference between the contemporary moment and the (dare I say) pre-modern Silk Road experience, is the emergence and hardening of state institutions. States jealously control territory and borders, and state managers manipulate nationalist narratives to maintain state power. And they have greater capacity to do so now. All of this creates more potential for obstruction of cosmopolitanism, trade, and international relations. There are some theorists of globalization who thought that, since the 1970s, the growth of financial capital had overwhelmed the state, that the state was largely kaput. If the current crisis has shown us anything, it is just how central state institutions are to the management of global capital.
So, maybe all roads run back to Oxiana, but you have to have a visa...

[Peony]

Hi Sam,

Just arrived back in Japan after a long haul across the ocean... Thank you so much for your comment here and to your longer comments at your blog regarding Bell. After I unpack I wanted to respond. For now, just a a quick thank you! And I would love to hear about your meeting Frank...The more I learn about his life and scholarship, the more intrigued I become. You are right, we all should be so flexible...

[Sam Crane]

You might like Frank's book, ReOrient.

[Peony]

I'll try to find it! Thank you-- and you probably noticed I just left a comment over at your place. Also, I hope it's ok, but I wanted to email you about Frank later as I found your comment above to be so interesting and wanted to ask you about it. One of Frank's sons-- a very, very charming man who has inherited his father's intelligence as well, reads here and he might enjoy hearing your anacdote about his father in Madison-- only if you have time, of course :)

I bet it is freezing in Madison now-- do you ever go back. I never have been back-- though I'd like very much to see the lakes there again someday.

[Sam]

I haven't been back to Madison since 1986! I should go some time.

I recount my time with Frank over at my blog (it is a bit long).