Koto-ba

For Conrad (better late than never?)

Why Heidegger was NOT a charlatan!

It was precisely in this context that Heidegger wrote his essay, I think. And, the essay's main project was not (not at all) an attempt to come to terms with "the alterity of Japanese thinking," nor was it even to try and shine light on Japan's own cultural paradigm (clearing); but rather Heidegger was exploring-- in a poetic style-- the manner in which language is a reflection of our understanding of being-- and that that understanding of being changes over time and place. This is the first point .

Heidegger, to be sure, is not clear-spoken.

But neither was Kant and neither was Nietzsche. And like Kant and Nietzshe, Heidegger invented an elaborate vocaubalary which must be addressed if one wants to seriously engage his work. One could no more productively read Kant ignoring the technical terms. In particular in these latter essays, he adopts a poetical style (such as it is) that actually has something in common with Nietzshe's. And, this is the second point: just as your friend Matt suggested, the words have all been defined (except iki, which is the project of that particular essay in question I believe)-- therefore, as Matt said, it all does make sense (well, it at least is not nonesense) .   

The third point is that, the Japanese words are not obscure, but rather are everyday words. Kotoba and iki are in the lexicon of my 6 year old son, and Heidegger's take on their meaning and etymology (vis-a-vis the mysterious Count Kuki Shuzo) are also the standard take. That is to say that neither the word koto-ba, nor its etymology as presented in this essay by Heidegger are particularly problematic from a Japanese point of view.

Who am I, though, to state what is or is not problematic to a Japanese point of view?

Well, just to get rid of any possible doubt you might have, I went and asked Matoki Saito, who is a lecturer in philosophy at Hosei University. Not only does he manage the Heidegger Forum of Japan (an online mailing list for Heidegger scholars in Japan), but he is teaching the book A Dialog on Language (the book in question) this term in his Readings in German Philosophy class and is very interested in issues of multi-culturalism in Heidegger. When I asked Professor Saito about whether Heidegger got it right concerning kotoba, he had this to say:

HeideggerのLanguage=Sage=Koto/baの理解については、ご指摘のとおり、神道や禅、また中国思想からの影響がある、と言えるかもしれません。一説には、『存在と時間』執筆時にすでに道元の『正法眼蔵』に触れていたとい
う話もありますし、また有名な話ですが、後期には老子の翻訳を試みてもいます。そのような点から考えると、りあんさんご指摘のように、「木の葉にも神がいるという神道　＋　言霊という、最も日本的な考えを考慮したこと」も十分ありえたと言えるのではないか、と思います。

Concerning Heidegger's understanding of Language=Sage=Koto/ba, I think just as you suggested it can be said that his concept can serve as a reflectsion of Shinto, zen, and Chinese thought. There is one theory that Heidegger wrote Being in Time after having already read Dogen's Shobogenzo. And an even more famous anacdote tells of the philosopher's attempts in his later life to try and translate Laozi. With these points in mind, I think it is safe to agree with you that within his understanding of kotoba we can see the fundamentally Japanese concept of kotodama, as well as Shinto concepts of kami dwelling in nature (including tree leaves: the ba or kotoba).

Indeed, considering Heidegger's own knowledge of Japan was limited to say the least, I personally have always found it pretty incredible that he was able to get as far as he did in that essay; which is all to say that not only did Heidegger NOT have it wrong, but he was surprisingly relavant.

Returning back to Heidegger's aim in the essay, though.

What was his aim? Well, I think it was this: by analyzing the meaning of the Japanese term "kotoba" we can catch a glimpse of the Japanese understanding of being (ie "the lightening message of grace.") That is because language serves to "light up" (or make intelligeable) this understanding. At the same time language is rooted in the understanding-- as of course, different people in different cultures say different things. You can see this particularly easy in languages as different as Japanese and English, but even the same person will not say the same things when they speak English as when they speak Japanese (to say nothing of presentation and other cultural niceties).

This is not to say that language affects our understanding of the world, but rather to say that language is a reflection of our understanding of being.  

And again, his choice of "kotoba" is not an exploration of the uniqueness of the Japanese, but rather is just the particular example Heidegger chooses to utilize in order to make his point.

For those who wish to explore further, I would say start by looking at Shintoism, Kotodama and Manyoshu, for starters. In addition, this Japanese langauge wiki article on kotodama explains the way this unque understand of "word" is reflective of Japanese culture as reflected in modern day Shinto wedding ceremonies , or in the phrase:  「言霊の幸ふ国」　『万葉集』 (Manyoshu).

This also does a fine job of laying out the territory in terms of Being and Time.

Comments

[Aegeus]

Better late than never, indeed. Thanks for taking the time to clarify your views. However, I am still not convinced.

"Heidegger, to be sure, is not clear-spoken. But neither was Kant and neither was Nietzsche."

True, but Kant was precise, and Nietzsche was witty, funny and pithy: Heidegger is none of these. I have to confess I suspect Nietzsche would have been as embarrassed by H's style as by his philosophy.

"Kotoba and iki are in the lexicon of my 6 year old son, and Heidegger's take on their meaning and etymology... are also the standard take."

I don't doubt that your son knows the words kotoba and iki, but I very much doubt that H's explanations can reasonably be called 'the standard take'--either his 'pure delight of the beckoning stillness' or his 'appropriating occurrence of the lightening message of grace'. If you can provide some pre-Heideggerian sources that use this sort of language or thinking, I'll believe you. They do not correspond at all to what my Japanese-speaking authorities provided me with.

"language is rooted in the understanding"

Yes, and understanding is rooted in language; whether or not these claims are true, they seem clear enough without going on about 'grace' or 'being'.

"Does kotoba somehow reflect the Japanese understanding of being (not in its entirity but some aspect of their cultural paradigm)? I think the understanding is unquestionably Yes."

I don't understand the parenthesis. As for the latter statement, you claim it, but you haven't argued it. (And I can't read the Japanese Wiki article.) Does the etymology of our word "language" tell us much about our concept of Being? Does it even tell us much about our concept of language? I'm sure I would enjoy an explanation of why it did--but I'm also sure I wouldn't believe it.

[Peony]

To Aegeus—the King:

Thank you for reading! I agree with everything you say about style; for writing that bad, well, it is hard to forgive. If you paid me huge lumps of money, still I would not read Heidegger again.

Never again, that’s my motto.

Now, whether our blubbering uberman and his sidekick dionysus is one to laugh or not…. Well, I wouldn’t read him again either.

The problem with your original post, I remain convinced, is

1)You did not read the essay in terms of the context of Heidegger’s project (as spelled out in Being and Time). Those latter essays do not stand alone and that’s why they made absolutely no sense to you.

2) Your “Japanese experts” were actually one person (Matt). And he pointed out already that the essay would make sense if all those terms had been defined (which they already have been defined in Being and Time).

3) I Think to prove my point regarding etymology and understanding of being I would actually need to show-- NOT a pre-Heideggerean thinker-- but rather something in the culture he is talking about (ie, japan) that proves he was on to something... And I think I already did that　(cf. Shinto concept of gods dwelling in nature--including tree leaves-- & kotodama).

*Also, this is not as way of proving anything per se, but Heidegger and H. Bergson are perhaps two of the most influential Western philosphers who have impacted modern Japanese philosophy. The Japanese seem to feel a real affinity to him and I will ask my philosophy professor at the University of Hiroshima as soon as I finish the translation I am working on for him, but I have never heard any dispute of this particular essay from a Japanese source. I will confirm with the Prof, however as he would know better.

Note: The 'appropriating ocurrence of the lightening message of grace' is not talking about Japanese “koto-ba” but about language in general; how language “lights up” the way we think about being… is how I would translate it, but like I said, I haven’t read Heidegger in years… The beckoning grace one, well, what can I say, I have no idea…(but just because I cannot comment is not to say Heidegger was wrong but rather I am not prepared to seriously take on his idea).

Finally to your main point: does the etymology of our word "language" tell us much about our concept of Being? In the case of koto-ba, Heidegger it seems had a vague point. And, this is not saying I think he nailed it, but rather just that, no, I don’t think he was a charlatan. Cheers.

[slawkenbergius]

I think the central lesson to be learned from this is not that Heidegger is a charlatan, but that etymology as a philosophical method is a complete waste of time and inevitably exposes you as a dilettante. It was stupid when Nietzsche did it and it was stupid when Heidegger did it; as far as I can tell, it was stupid when Derrida did it too--and let's not forget Proust. The best it can do is provide a sort of clever example; certainly no central or significant part of an argument can legitimately be made to rest upon it. Leave etymology to the etymologists, for Christ's sake. At least they usually know what they're talking about.

[Peony]

What is the basis for your statement, though? Indeed, it was only as you say a clever example. But, as my philosophy professors repeatedly instilled in me way back when... philosophy without example is rather hard to understand. So, I do not fault Heidegger for using an example to back up his theory. And, more, the example was not only clever, but his example of kotoba was-- despite his not being an etymologist-- also surprisingly accurate as well (for someone in that time and place).

Examples (etymological or otherwise) are always required, I would argue, if you are trying to do phenomonemology....

A friend of Conrad's is a friend of mine... not really but welcome-- and thanks so much for reading!